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EIP-4736 Consensus Layer Withdrawal Protection

FinalInterfacecreated 2022-01-30

Additional security for BLSToExecutionChange operation when a consensus layer mnemonic may be compromised, without changing consensus

Authors: Benjamin Chodroff (@benjaminchodroff), Jim McDonald (@mcdee)

What the specification covers

AbstractMotivationSpecificationBLSToExecutionChange Broadcast FileBLSToExecutionChange HandlingRationaleBackwards CompatibilityReference ImplementationBLSToExecutionChange Broadcast FileBLSToExecutionChange Broadcast File - ClaimClaim AcceptanceBLSToExecutionChange BroadcastSecurity Considerations1: Attacker lacks EL deposit key, uncontested claim2: Attacker has both EL deposit key and CL keys, uncontested claim3: Same as 2, but the attacker submits a contested claim4: A user has lost either their CL key and/or mnemonic (no withdrawal key)5: End game - attacker6: Compromised key, but not vulnerable to withdrawal7: Attacker loads a malicious BLSToExecutionChange Broadcast file into one or multiple nodes, User A submits claim8: Same as 7, but User A submits no claimSecond Order EffectsCopyright

This proposal declares no Solidity interface, so there is nothing to compute. It may be a core protocol change, a meta proposal, or written in prose only.

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